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Economic decisions are often made in stressful situations (e.g., at the trading floor),
but the effects of stress on economic decision making have not been systematically
investigated so far. The present study examines how acute stress influences economic
decision making under uncertainty (risk and ambiguity) using financially incentivized
lotteries. We varied the domain of decision making as well as the expected value of
the risky prospect. Importantly, no feedback was provided to investigate risk taking and
ambiguity aversion independent from learning processes. In a sample of 75 healthy young
participants, 55 of whom underwent a stress induction protocol (Trier Social Stress Test for
Groups), we observed more risk seeking for gains. This effect was restricted to a subgroup
of participants that showed a robust cortisol response to acute stress (n = 26). Gambling
under ambiguity, in contrast to gambling under risk, was not influenced by the cortisol
response to stress. These results show that acute psychosocial stress affects economic
decision making under risk, independent of learning processes. Our results further point
to the importance of cortisol as a mediator of this effect.
Keywords: stress, cortisol, risk, ambiguity, uncertainty, gain/loss domain, decision making
INTRODUCTION
Stress is an increasingly important factor influencing our daily
lives. It primarily activates two systems: the sympathetic nervous
system (SNS) and the hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal (HPA)
axis (e.g., Kudielka and Kirschbaum, 2007). Heart rate can be
taken as a proxy for sympathetic activity, whereas the adrenal hor-
mone cortisol indicates the activity of the HPA axis. Cortisol is
secreted into the blood stream by the adrenal glands in response
to the hormonal cascade of the HPA axis. As a steroid hormone,
cortisol crosses the blood-brain barrier, and thereby reaches the
brain. Cortisol binds to two types of receptors, with high affin-
ity to mineralocorticoid receptors and with lower affinity, i.e.,
only if concentration is high as for example under acute stress,
to glucocorticoid receptors (De Kloet, 2004). The latter recep-
tors are ubiquitously expressed in the brain, so cortisol can exert
diverse modulating influences on emotional as well as cognitive
processes.
The influence of stress on cognition is well documented for
example in the domain of long-term memory (Wolf, 2009).
Recent studies also investigated other cognitive functions like
working memory (e.g., Schoofs et al., 2008; see also Buckert et al.,
2012) and executive functions (e.g., Scholz et al., 2009; Plessow
et al., 2012) under acute stress. Much less research exists concern-
ing the influence of stress on decision making, even though many
decisions—particularly in the economic area—are made under
stress, be it time pressure, work load, pressure of competition,
or threat of job loss. It is thus of great importance to investi-
gate the effect of stress on decision making. While recent studies
indeed provide first evidence that decision making is influenced
by acute stress (for a recent review see Starcke and Brand, 2012),
the specific mechanisms of how stress influences decision making
are not yet understood.
Most studies report more risk taking under acute stress
(Preston et al., 2007; Starcke et al., 2008; Lighthall et al., 2009;
van den Bos et al., 2009; Pabst et al., 2013c). Yet, one study found
increased risk taking only for losses, while for gains risk tak-
ing was decreased by stress (Porcelli and Delgado, 2009). Still
another study reported less risk taking only for losses whereas
for gains stress had no effect (Pabst et al., 2013b). Clark et al.
(2012) observed risk avoidant behavior in trials containing losses
when the threat of an electric shock was present. Some stud-
ies also found no differences in risk taking between stress and
control groups (Lempert et al., 2012; Gathmann et al., 2014).
Furthermore, some of the studies observed gender interactions
with stress, i.e., stressed men being risk seeking and stressed
women being risk avoidant (Preston et al., 2007; Lighthall et al.,
2009) unless very high levels of cortisol are reached (van den
Bos et al., 2009). However, others did not find any gender differ-
ences in decision making under stress (Starcke et al., 2008; Pabst
et al., 2013b,c). Related studies investigating risk taking under
time pressure found that risk taking was differentially affected
for gains, losses, and mixed options (Ben Zur and Breznitz, 1981;
Jones et al., 2011; Young et al., 2012; Kocher et al., 2013). Taken
together, it can thus be concluded that stress effects on risk
taking are plausible, but their exact nature and the conditions
under which stress influences risk taking are only beginning to
be understood.
Previous studies differ regarding several aspects that might
be responsible for the somewhat mixed results reported
(Table 1). First of all, different stressors might account for
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Table 1 | Previous studies of stress effects on decision making under
uncertainty.
Study Task Domain Stressor
Preston
et al. (2007)




IGT (ambiguity) mixed TSST
Lighthall
et al. (2009)
















GDT (risk) mixed TSST
Pabst et al.
(2013b)
GDT (risk) gain, loss TSST
Pabst et al.
(2013c)
GDT (risk) mixed TSST
Gathmann
et al. (2014)

























Lotteries (risk) mixed, gain, loss Time
pressure
Previous studies differed regarding the stressor employed (TSST, Trier Social
Stress Test), the decision making task (IGT, Iowa Gambling Task, BART, Balloon
Analogue Risk Task, GDT, Game of Dice Task), as well as the domain of decision
making (mixed: contains gains and losses). If probabilities are given, the task is
considered to assess risk, whereas if probabilities are not provided, decisions
are considered to be made under ambiguity.
some heterogeneity. Several studies applied psychosocial stress
induction procedures (Preston et al., 2007; Starcke et al., 2008;
van den Bos et al., 2009; Pabst et al., 2013a,b,c; Gathmann et al.,
2014), others used physiological stressors (Lighthall et al., 2009,
2012; Porcelli and Delgado, 2009), still others the threat of an
electric shock (Clark et al., 2012). Time pressure could also be
seen as a stressor. Yet, physiological parameters have rarely been
assessed in time pressure studies, thus making a direct com-
parison with other stressors difficult. It is conceivable that the
different stressors evoked diverging patterns of physiological and
neuronal activity, thereby leading to different effects on decision
making. A recent study also pointed to the importance of the tim-
ing of the decision making task in relation to the stress induction
(Pabst et al., 2013a). Whereas choice behavior was risk avoidant
5 and 18min. after stress onset, more risk taking was observed
28min. later when cortisol levels peaked.
Furthermore, when studying decision making under uncer-
tainty, risk can be differentiated from ambiguity (e.g., Knight,
1921/2012; Ellsberg, 1961; Brand et al., 2006; Weber and Johnson,
2009)1. Most decisions we usually face contain some degree of
uncertainty, which means that the outcome of the decision is not
certain beforehand. Uncertainty can be thought of as a contin-
uum from certainty to complete ignorance (Starcke and Brand,
2012). In that context, risk means that while the actual outcome
of a decision is unknown, the probabilities for each possible event
are known to the decision-maker. In contrast, in ambiguous deci-
sions, information regarding probabilities is lacking, either in part
or completely (Starcke and Brand, 2012). Related to this distinc-
tion is the discrimination between decisions from description
vs. decisions from experience (Hertwig and Erev, 2009). While
the features of risky decisions can easily be described explicitly,
aspects of ambiguous decisions like probabilities often need to be
acquired through experience, i.e., learning from feedback.
In previous studies of stress effects on decision making, the
distinction between risk and ambiguity has not been explored sys-
tematically. Preston et al. (2007) and van den Bos et al. (2009)
used the well-known Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara et al.,
1994). Lighthall et al. (2009) applied the Balloon Analogue Risk
Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002). For both games, the probabil-
ity distribution is not known to the subjects beforehand but has
to be acquired through learning (IGT) or is dynamically chang-
ing (BART), respectively. Therefore, decisions in these tasks have
to be made under ambiguity (cf. Fecteau et al., 2007b; Lighthall
et al., 2009).
Risk taking was assessed either using lotteries (Porcelli and
Delgado, 2009; Lempert et al., 2012), a common form of pre-
senting choices in behavioral economics, or the so-called Game
of Dice Task (GDT; Brand et al., 2005; Starcke et al., 2008; Pabst
et al., 2013a,b,c; Gathmann et al., 2014). Nevertheless, the results
from the latter studies are somewhat inconsistent in so far as some
observed more risk taking under acute stress (Starcke et al., 2008;
Pabst et al., 2013c; but see Lempert et al., 2012; Gathmann et al.,
2014) while other studies reported differentially affected risk tak-
ing for gains and losses (Porcelli and Delgado, 2009; Pabst et al.,
2013b).
It is difficult to draw definite conclusions from those stud-
ies as they differ in several further aspects, most importantly
the decision making domain. Here, pure domains,—i.e., options
that contain only positive (pure gain) or only negative (pure
loss) amounts—are distinguished from the mixed domain in
which one option can yield either a gain or a loss, and it is
known that the domain can influence decision making (e.g.,
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Whereas pure gain and pure
loss domains were used in the lotteries of Porcelli and Delgado
(2009) and the modified GDT of Pabst et al. (2013b), the IGT
(Preston et al., 2007; van den Bos et al., 2009) and the original
GDT (Starcke et al., 2008; Pabst et al., 2013a,c) provide mixed
domain options. Therefore, the possibility exists that risk taking
1Note that Knight (1921) used the term uncertainty instead of the term ambi-
guity which was introduced by Ellsberg (1961) and is commonly used today.
Throughout the paper we use uncertainty as an umbrella term.
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is differentially influenced by stress depending on the decision
making domain.
Furthermore, expected value was not systematically varied in
the above-cited studies of stress effects on decision making. In
some games, like the IGT (Bechara et al., 1994) and the GDT
(Brand et al., 2005), the riskier options always have lower expected
values (and are therefore disadvantageous), whereas in the lotter-
ies used by Porcelli and Delgado (2009), expected values were kept
constant across all options. In the BART (Lejuez et al., 2002), the
expected value is changing with each pump of the balloon.
Besides the differences reported so far, almost all of the pre-
viously described studies share one important task feature, i.e.,
they provided feedback about the outcome immediately after each
choice. This enables learning processes and, indeed, disturbed
learning from feedback seems to be one very plausible mechanism
by which stress exerts its detrimental effect on decision making
(Petzold et al., 2010; Mather and Lighthall, 2012). Yet, by provid-
ing feedback the distinction between decisions from description
and decisions from experience (see above) can no longer bemade.
Therefore, it is unclear if feedback learning is the only process
affected by stress or if stress also exerts effects on risk taking as
such, i.e., without feedback. Empirical evidence is inconclusive
so far as one study that elicited indifference points between risky
options and sure amounts did not provide feedback and found
no stress effect (Lempert et al., 2012). Yet, another study also
included an experimental condition without feedback (Starcke
et al., 2008). For this condition, the authors still observed a group
difference between stress and control groups that was significant
at trend level (p = 0.08).
To summarize, up to now a definite answer is lacking for the
question if risk taking per se is affected by stress. In case this can
be confirmed, then the potential impact of the type of uncer-
tainty and the decision domains warrants further investigation.
Therefore, our study was designed to investigate these questions
systematically by applying a decision making task that distin-
guishes risk from ambiguity, that varies domains and expected
value orthogonally, and that does not provide feedback.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SAMPLE
The study procedure was approved by the ethics committee of the
German Psychological Society. Eighty-nine participants, mostly
students of the University of Heidelberg, took part in the study
after giving written informed consent. Eight subjects had to be
excluded from analysis as they met one of our exclusion criteria
(i.e., mental, physical, or neurological disorders, intake of medi-
cation2, use of illicit drugs or heavy smoking, as well as a native
language other than German). Furthermore, five subjects could
not be included in the analysis because of problems with data
collection. One subject in the control group showed amarked cor-
tisol response (i.e., above our responder criterion of 2.5 nmol/l,
see below) and was therefore also excluded. The remaining sam-
ple consisted of 75 participants (39 women and 36 men). Mean
age of the sample was 21.95 ± 2.763, mean BMI was 22.14 ± 2.53.
2exception: L-Thyroxin (1 participant) was allowed.
3N = 74 as one participant did not provide this information.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the stress
(55 participants) or the control condition (20 participants).
We recruitedmore subjects for the stress condition as we observed
a very high rate of nonresponders (N = 29) to the TSST-G
procedure during data collection (see below).
GENERAL PROCEDURE
All sessions started at 14:30 h to minimize confounding influ-
ences of the cortisol diurnal rhythm, and lasted 2 h. Participants
were requested to abstain from eating, drinking, smoking, or
exercising within 1 h prior to the study. After arriving at the lab-
oratory, participants were equipped with heart rate measurement
devices (see below) and filled in questionnaires on demographic
data and personality characteristics. After half an hour, mild psy-
chosocial stress was induced using the Trier Social Stress Test for
Groups (TSST-G) in the stress group, whereas the control group
went through a control procedure, respectively (von Dawans
et al., 2011). Immediately afterwards, participants worked on
the economic decision making task for about 15min. Then,
further questionnaires were administered and working memory
performance was assessed. During the experiment, seven saliva
samples were collected for the analysis of cortisol (see below for
details).
TRIER SOCIAL STRESS TEST FOR GROUPS (TSST-G)
For stress induction, a modified version (cf. Buckert et al., 2012)
of the TSST-G (von Dawans et al., 2011) was applied in groups
of four participants (in one session only three) of the same sex.
Analogous to the original TSST (Kirschbaum et al., 1993), the
paradigm was performed in a separate room and consisted of
three stages: the preparation period, a free speech (8min. total,
i.e., 2min. per participant), and a mental arithmetic task (8min.
total, i.e., 2min. per participant). During the free speech, partic-
ipants had to present themselves and argue why they believed to
be the best candidate for their respective dream job. The men-
tal arithmetic task consisted of counting backwards in two-digit
steps starting with a four-digit number (e.g., counting backwards
in steps of 17 starting with 2034). All tasks were performed in
front of a white-coated jury consisting of a man and a woman,
who stayed neutral throughout the test and did not give any social
feedback. Additionally, the participants were videotaped with two
digital camcorders. To maximize uncontrollability, the order in
which participants had to perform the free speech and the mental
arithmetic task was randomized. Further details about the setting
can be found in von Dawans et al. (2011).
As control procedure, the placebo TSST-G described in von
Dawans et al. (2011) was adapted and slightly modified. It con-
sisted of a silent reading period (11min.) and a paper-and-pencil
mental arithmetic task (8min.) in which arithmetic addition and
subtraction problems of varying difficulty were handed out and
participants were free to choose which one they wanted to work
on and how many problems they wanted to solve. Participants
were told that their results would not be controlled. The control
procedure was performed in the same room as the TSST-G, but no
videotaping was performed and no jury members were present.
Instead, the experimenter stayed in the room to instruct the
participants. Both procedures lasted approximately half an hour.
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DECISION MAKING TASK
The decision making task was programmed in z-tree (U.
Fischbacher, University of Zürich, http://www.iew.uzh.ch/ztree)
and consisted of 90 binary lottery trials. In each trial, the partic-
ipant was asked to choose between options A and B via mouse
click. No feedback was provided. The task consisted of two parts,
one investigating decision making under risk, the other investi-
gating decision making under ambiguity. All trials were presented
in randomized order.
In the risk part, probabilities were displayed graphically as
vertical bars similar to the display used by Hayden et al. (2010)
and Putman et al. (2010). Pure gain, pure loss, and mixed deci-
sion domains were incorporated through color coding, i.e., yellow
indicated winning and green indicated loosing while blue was the
neutral color that was used for nonwinning or nonlosing in the
pure domains (see Figure 1A). Potential reward values (in points
that were later converted into money; see below) were displayed
numerically above the bars and contained a minus sign for losses.
In the mixed domain, gains were displayed above the bar and
losses below the bar. The alternative option was always a sure gain
(for pure gain andmixed domains) or a sure loss (for the pure loss
domain) of 10 points, represented by a completely yellow or green
bar, respectively. The position of the sure option (i.e., option A or
B) was counterbalanced across participants.
The expected value of the risky option was varied at three lev-
els, i.e., being higher, equal, or lower as compared to the sure
amount. For the pure domains, this was accomplished through
the combination of three reward values (15, 20, 30 points) and
three probability levels (1/3, 1/2, 2/3), resulting in nine differ-
ent items per domain (three items per level of expected value,
i.e., higher vs. equal vs. lower). Each of these items was presented
twice. In themixed domain, either the gain or the loss amount was
varied for a given probability level (again 1/3, 1/2, 2/3), yielding
six different items per level of expected value. Each of the decision
domains thus comprised 18 trials, i.e., 54 in total.
In the ambiguity part, ambiguity was introduced by gray
occluders (cf. Hayden et al., 2010) equipped with a question mark
overshadowing information about probabilities (Figure 1B).
Three different occluder sizes (i.e., 1/3, 1/2, or complete) rep-
resented three different degrees of ambiguity. In this part, the
alternative option was a risky lottery with a constant probability
level of 0.5 and a constant reward value of 20 points. The occlud-
ers in the ambiguous option were centered around the probability
level of the risky option, i.e., 50%. Again, expected value was var-
ied at three levels analogous to the risk part by varying the reward
values of the ambiguous option (i.e., 15, 20, 30 points). Only pure
gain and loss domains were implemented (nine different trials
each, three per expected value level) and all trials were presented
once. Importantly, to overcome beliefs (see Trautmann and van
de Kuilen, in press, for the important role of beliefs in ambiguity
aversion) the instruction made explicit that all probabilities in the
covered area are equally probable and that the actual probability
is unknown also to the experimenter because it is determined by
a computer program. Note that here ambiguity is operationalized
as “second order probabilities” as opposed to the classic opera-
tionalization via Ellsberg urns (cf. Trautmann and van de Kuilen,
in press).
As the ambiguity part differed from the risk part in several
respects, we added nine trials to control for potential influences
of the type of the alternative (i.e., risky lottery vs. sure amount)
and the probability level (i.e., 1/3, 1/2, 2/3). These items were pre-
sented once in the gain and in the loss domain. Analysis of these
additional items, however, gave no indication of confounding
effects. We will thus not report results related to these items.
PAYMENT SCHEME
Participants received a small show-up fee (3 Euros). In the deci-
sion making task, they were instructed that one of the trials in
each domain (pure gain: risk or ambiguity; pure loss: risk or
ambiguity; mixed: risk) would be selected randomly and paid out.
The points they won or lost in the selected three trials would be
summed first and then converted into Euro by division of 2. If
the sum was negative, nothing was paid, but subjects did not have
to pay either. This was not told participants beforehand and no
one asked about this possibility. Therefore, losses are supposed to
be experienced as real losses during decision making (cf. Kocher




Heart rate was measured continuously using Polar Sport Tester
RS800CX (Polar Elektro GmbH, Groß-Gerau, Germany). Each
participant was equipped with a breast belt and a display similar
to a wrist watch. For analysis, the Polar Pro Trainer software was
used. Data were aggregated into six intervals: pre-stress (dura-
tion: 15min.), TSST-preparation (3min.), TSST-speech (8min.),
TSST-arithmetic (8min.), decision making task (10–15min.) and
post-stress (15min.). Note that because of measurement failures
in 11 persons, sample size is N = 64 for heart rate analysis.
Cortisol
Saliva samples were collected at seven time points through-
out the experiment using Salivette collection devices (Sarsted,
Nuembrecht, Germany): 15min. after arriving (−15), 1min.
before (−1) and directly after the TSST-G (+1), as well as repeat-
edly afterwards (+15, +25, +45, +60min.). For one subject,
sample two was not utilizable, so for calculation of the variable
cortisol increase (see below) sample one was used instead of sam-
ple two. For four other subjects, one of the other samples (samples
1, 6, or 7) could not be analyzed. Therefore, these five subjects
are not included in the repeated measures analyses of cortisol
data. Samples were analyzed by the Psychobiological Research
Laboratory of the University of Trier, Germany, using a time-
resolved immunoassay with fluorometric detection (DELFIA, cf.
Dressendörfer et al., 1992). Intra-assay variation was 4.0–6.7%,
inter-assay variation 7.1–9.0%.
Subjective mood rating
Subjective mood was assessed by the German mood ques-
tionnaire “Mehrdimensionaler Befindlichkeitsfragebogen” (MDBF;
Steyer et al., 1997) before and directly after the TSST-G or control
procedure, respectively. The MDBF consists of a list of adjectives
constituting three scales (elevated vs. depressed mood, calmness
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FIGURE 1 | Behavioral paradigm. (A) Example displays of risk trials. Colors
indicate the domains (yellow: gains; green: losses; blue: neutral). Amounts that
can be won or lost are depicted above the bars, or in case of the mixed domain,
above and below, respectively. Height of the colored part of the bars indicates
the probability to win or lose and was varied at three levels (1/3, 1/2, 2/3).
(B) Example displays of ambiguity trials. Ambiguity was introduced through
gray occluders overshadowing all or part of the probability information.Occluder
sizes varied at three levels (complete, 1/2, 1/3; cf. panels from left to right).
vs. restlessness, wakefulness vs. sleepiness). Because of missing
data, analyses are based onN = 73 for the mood and wakefulness
subscales and N = 72 for the calmness subscale.
WORKING MEMORY
As several studies pointed to the fact that risk taking and work-
ingmemory performance are related (Cokely, 2009; Corbin, 2010;
Starcke et al., 2011; Brevers et al., 2012), we decided to include a
short measure of working memory performance in our study 4
. We used the digit span (forward) subtest of the German adap-
tation of the Wechsler Intelligence Scales for Adults (Tewes and
Wechsler, 1991). This test was slightly modified for the use in a
group setting. Subjects were asked to write down each memo-
rized series of digits, rather than speaking them out loudly after
listening to the experimenter reading them.Workingmemory was
assessed in the resting phase after the decision making task (i.e.,
half an hour after cessation of the TSST-G or control procedure,
respectively).
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Statistical analyses were carried out using the SPSS statistical
software package (IBM SPSS Statistics, version 20; Chicago, IL,
USA). The stress response was analyzed using repeated mea-
sures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) for heart rate (six time
points) and cortisol data (seven time points). For cortisol data,
log-transformed variables were used for statistical analyses. For
better interpretability, untransformed raw data are displayed in
the Figures. Potential confounding variables like age and BMI, as
described in the literature, did not emerge any effects on corti-
sol and heart rate responses, and were therefore not included as
4Furthermore, risk preferences were assessed using the paper-and-pencil ver-
sion of a widely used multiple price list (Holt and Laury, 2002). Yet, as this
task did not turn out to be relevant as covariate (probably because it differs in
several respects from the risk task applied under stress) it was not included in
the analyses and will not be considered in detail here.
covariates in the statistical analysis. Gender was always included
as between-subjects factor. As we observed considerable variabil-
ity in the cortisol response in the stress group, this group was
split into cortisol responders and nonresponders by applying the
literature-based criterion of an individual peak cortisol increase
of 2.5 nmol/l or more which is thought to reflect a secretory
episode (cf. Kirschbaum et al., 1992; Schommer et al., 2003). For
all following analyses, three groups were compared, i.e., cortisol
responders vs. nonresponders vs. nonstressed controls.
The individual peak cortisol increase was determined for each
participant by subtracting the pre-stress cortisol level (measure-
ment point −1; see Figure 2A) from the highest level reached
afterwards (not log-transformed). Similarly, increase in heart rate
was defined as the difference between the period with the highest
mean heart rate during stress induction (i.e., preparation, speech,
or arithmetic) and the pre-stress period. For subjective mood
changes, difference scores between the pre- and post-stress mea-
sures for each MDBF scale were calculated. Group comparisons
were performed using univariate ANOVAs including gender as
additional factor.
Analysis of decision making behavior was done separately for
the risk and the ambiguity part via repeated measures ANOVAs.
Percentage of choices of the risky or ambiguous alternative,
respectively, was the dependent variable in all analyses. Working
memory performance was tested as covariate and included if sig-
nificant influences were obtained. For the analysis of the risk part,
the repeated measures ANOVA contained the within-subjects fac-
tors domain (gain, loss, mixed) and expected value of the risky
alternative (higher, equal, lower) and the between-subjects factors
group (cortisol responders, nonresponders, control) and gender.
The same ANOVA was performed for the ambiguity part, except
that here the factor domain had only two levels (gain, loss).
In all repeated measures analyses, Huynh-Feldt corrections
were applied if sphericity was violated. Simple contrasts compar-
ing cortisol responders to nonresponders and controls were used
to follow up significant main effects in case of a priori hypotheses.
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FIGURE 2 | Physiologic stress markers. Time course of salivary cortisol (A) and heart rate (B). Gray bars indicate the timing of the Trier Social Stress Test for
Groups (TSST-G). Depicted are means ± standard errors of the mean (s.e.m.).
Otherwise pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrected levels




As groups were built upon the criterion of a peak corti-
sol increase equal or above 2.5 nmol/l, peak maximal cortisol
increase was significantly different between the three groups
[F(2, 69) = 54.93; p < 0.001; 10.48 ± 6.45 nmol/l in responders
vs. 1.01± 1.09 nmol/l in nonresponders and−1.22± 1.99 nmol/l
in controls; both contrasts p < 0.001]. Gender differences were
more pronounced in the cortisol responder and the control group
compared to the nonresponder group [interaction group × gen-
der: F(2, 69) = 3.21; p = 0.047]; yet, gender effects per group
were not significant. When including time, a significant group
× time interaction [F(4.7,150.41) = 37.97; p < 0.001] emerged in
the repeated measures analysis additionally to the main effect
of group [F(2, 64) = 23.34; p < 0.001], indicating that cortisol
responders differed from nonresponders and controls specifi-
cally for the measurement points 3 through 7 (all p < 0.001)
(Figure 2A). Furthermore, men had higher cortisol levels com-
pared to women [F(1, 64) = 5.59; p = 0.021], specifically at the
first three measurement points [interaction time × gender:
F(2.35,150.41) = 5.66; p = 0.003].
Similarly, peak heart rate increase differed significantly
between groups [F(2, 58) = 19.88, p < 0.001; 33.05 ± 12.58 bpm
in cortisol responders vs. 20.30± 9.54 bpm in nonresponders and
12.19 ± 5.18 bpm in controls; both contrasts p < 0.001]. Again,
this was also true for repeated measures analysis [main effect
of group: F(2, 58) = 4.28; p = 0.019; interaction time × group:
F(6.78,196.58) = 7.50; p < 0.001]. Separate univariate ANOVAs for
each measurement interval revealed that groups differed sig-
nificantly only during the TSST-G (i.e., preparation, speech,
and arithmetic; all p < 0.008). Simple contrasts confirmed that
cortisol responders differed from nonresponders (all p < 0.026)
as well as controls (all p < 0.006) during the TSST-G intervals
(Figure 2B).
Group differences in subjective changes were observed for
mood [F(2, 67) = 7.97; p = 0.001] and calmness [F(2, 66) = 8.78;
p < 0.001] ratings, but not for wakefulness ratings [F(2, 67) =
1.31; p = 0.276]. Simple contrasts revealed that cortisol respon-
ders displayed worse mood and higher restlessness after stress
induction compared to controls (both p < 0.001) but not com-
pared to nonresponders (both p > 0.27) (Figure 3).
DECISION MAKING
Test of working memory as covariate
Groups did not differ regarding working memory performance
(p > 0.11). Mean performance was 9.25 ± 2.14 points (it was
maximally possible to reach 14 points). A repeated measures
ANCOVA on risk taking was performed to test working mem-
ory performance as potential covariate. A significant main effect
(p = 0.041) and interaction with expected value (p = 0.033) were
obtained. Therefore, working memory performance was included
as covariate in further analyses of risk taking. For the ambiguity
part, working memory performance was not relevant as covariate
(p > 0.12).
Risk
First, we investigated whether the stress group as a whole dif-
fered from the control group regarding decision making in
risky lotteries and whether such an effect was moderated by
the domain of decision making. A repeated measures ANCOVA
including working memory performance as covariate was con-
ducted, with domain (gain, loss, and mixed) and expected value
(higher, equal, lower) as repeated factors, and group (stress, con-
trol) and gender as between subject factors. No significant main
or interaction effects for group were obtained (all p > 0.16).
Next, we repeated the analysis with the divided stress group,
i.e., comparing cortisol responders, nonresponders, and con-
trols. A significant main effect of group emerged [F(2, 68) = 3.36,
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience May 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 82 | 6
Buckert et al. Acute stress affects risk taking
FIGURE 3 | Subjective stress markers. Means ± s.e.m. of the change
scores of the mood questionnaire MDBF (Mehrdimensionaler
Befindlichkeitsfragebogen) from the measurement before the stress
induction to the measurement afterwards. Negative change scores indicate
an increase in negative mood (mood scale), an increase in restlessness
(calmness scale), and an increase in sleepiness (wakefulness scale). Simple
contrasts comparing cortisol responders to nonresponders and controls
were used to follow up significant main effects (∗∗p < 0.01).
p = 0.040]. Contrasts indicated that risk taking was higher in
responders compared to controls (p = 0.026; percentage of risky
choices: 0.49 ± 0.17 vs. 0.41 ± 0.13) as well as in comparison
to nonresponders (p = 0.031; 0.43 ± 0.14). Nevertheless, as the
triple interaction between group × domain × expected value was
tentatively significant as well [F(7.81,265.70) = 1.95; p = 0.055], we
repeated the analysis for each domain separately.
In the pure gain domain, a significant main effect of group
was again obtained [F(2, 68) = 5.87; p = 0.004] with contrasts
showing that responders chose more risky lotteries than controls
(p = 0.011; percentage of risky choices: 0.54 ± 0.26 vs. 0.41 ±
0.16) and nonresponders (p = 0.002; 0.39 ± 0.18). No significant
group differences were obtained in the analyses of pure loss and
mixed domains (Figure 4).
Ambiguity
Analogous to the risk part, a 2 (domain) × 3 (expected value) ×
2 (group) × 2 (gender) ANOVA was conducted, comparing the
stress group as a whole with the control group 5. No signifi-
cant effects of group or gender were observed. Also, when the
5Note that for the analysis of decision making behavior in the risk and ambi-
guity part repeated measures ANOVAs were applied, assuming a metric and
normally distributed variable. Applying an approach that does not make
these assumptions, i.e., generalized estimating equations, we reach the same
conclusions for both parts of the task.
analysis was repeated comparing cortisol responders (percent-
age of ambiguous choices: 0.50 ± 0.18), nonresponders (0.49 ±
0.17), and controls (0.48 ± 0.23), no significant effect of group
was obtained (Figure 5). Significant main effects of domain
[F(1, 69) = 18.16, p < 0.001] and expected value [F(2, 138) =
96.64, p < 0.001] as well as a significant interaction of domain
and expected value [F(2, 138) = 4.94, p = 0.008] emerged, point-
ing to an expected value-dependent reflection effect, i.e., higher
ambiguity acceptance for losses than for gains specifically for
higher expected values of the ambiguous alternative.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we investigated whether acute psychosocial stress
affects decision making under uncertainty, i.e., under risk and
under ambiguity, in a set of binary lotteries associated with real
monetary incentives. We varied decision domain (i.e., gain vs. loss
vs. mixed) and expected value of the risky alternative systemati-
cally, and did not provide any feedback between the choices—
with the aim of investigating risk taking independent of learning
processes. Those participants that were strongly affected by the
stressor as indicated by a cortisol increase of at least 2.5 nmol/l
showed considerably more risk taking in the pure gain domain
compared to controls.
STRESS AFFECTS RISK TAKING INDEPENDENT OF FEEDBACK
Previous studies investigating stress effects on decision making
mostly used tasks that included direct feedback of the outcome
after each trial (Preston et al., 2007; Lighthall et al., 2009, 2012;
Porcelli and Delgado, 2009; van den Bos et al., 2009; Pabst et al.,
2013a,b,c; Gathmann et al., 2014) and, therefore, the observed
stress effects on decision making could not be teased apart from
stress effects on learning from feedback. Indeed, several studies
found stress effects on feedback learning in other fields than deci-
sion making (Petzold et al., 2010; Lighthall et al., 2013). Only one
study implemented a no-feedback condition in the decision mak-
ing task and still observed a trend for more risk taking (Starcke
et al., 2008), thus pointing to the possibility that decision mak-
ing under uncertainty per se could be affected by stress. Applying
a task containing no feedback, our results strongly support this
presumption. Furthermore, our subjects were highly motivated to
perform advantageously in the task as part of their study payment
depended on their choices. As our payment scheme of randomly
selecting trials for payment discourages additional processes such
as mental accounting, we assume that the observed differences
in risk taking truly reflect stress-dependent influences on risk
preferences.
DOMAIN SPECIFICITY OF THE STRESS EFFECT
We observed a higher rate of risk taking of cortisol responders
only in the gain domain. This is in contrast to the results of
Porcelli and Delgado (2009) and Pabst et al. (2013b) who also
found evidence for domain-specific modulation of risk taking.
Yet, whereas Porcelli and Delgado (2009) report more risk taking
in the loss domain and less risk taking in the gain domain, Pabst
et al. (2013b) found less risk taking specifically in the loss domain.
Besides the different types of stressors used and missing informa-
tion about cortisol responses in the study by Porcelli and Delgado
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FIGURE 4 | Risky choices in the decision task. Percentage (± s.e.m.) of
choices of the risky option (vs. sure amounts) in the three domains of the
risk part of the decision making task. Simple contrasts comparing cortisol
responders to nonresponders and controls were used to follow up
significant main effects (∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01).
(2009), there are important differences regarding task character-
istics that could potentially account for the contradicting results.
First of all, choice was between two risky alternatives of varied
probability in Porcelli and Delgado (2009) whereas in our task
one option was a risky lottery and the other one a sure amount.
Similarly, in Pabst et al. (2013b) who applied amodified version of
the GDT, choice was between 14 risky options. Furthermore, par-
ticipants were not paid according to their choices in Pabst et al.
(2013b). Most importantly, the feedback provided in the studies
of Porcelli andDelgado (2009) and Pabst et al. (2013b)might have
influenced subsequent choice behavior.
Our results further seem to be at odds with a recent study
investigating the effect of anticipatory stress on a probability
discounting task embedded in a delay discounting paradigm
(Lempert et al., 2012). Here, choices had to be made between
varying sure amounts and lotteries in the gain domain at sev-
eral probability levels until indifference points were established.
Importantly, no immediate feedback was provided. In this study,
no stress effects on risk taking were observed and the corre-
lation between cortisol and risk taking was nonsignificant as
well. Again, we consider the possibility that differences regard-
ing the stress induction protocols or specific task characteristics
might be responsible for these contradicting results. One impor-
tant issue might be that the reported average cortisol response
was very low in the study of Lempert et al. (2012) and proba-
bly comprised mainly subjects that we would have classified as
nonresponders.
FIGURE 5 | Ambiguous choices in the decision task. Percentage
(±s.e.m.) of choices of the ambiguous option (vs. risky lotteries) in the two
domains of the ambiguity part of the decision making task.
Contrary to our expectations based on the results of previous
studies that reported a higher rate of risk taking in tasks that
included the mixed domain (Starcke et al., 2008; Pabst et al.,
2013c), we did not observe significantly more risk taking in
the mixed domain. There are several plausible reasons for this
difference. One possibility is that different cognitive processes
might be involved in tasks containing losses that are differentially
affected by stress compared to tasks with gains only. Therefore,
task characteristics like the complete randomization, i.e., mixture
of domains in the present study, might have affected our results.
Alternatively, and as already discussed above, disturbed learning
from feedback might be the mechanism behind the higher risk
proneness reported for mixed gambles so far. The study of Starcke
et al. (2008) which included one condition with and one without
feedback in a mixed domain gamble supports these interpreta-
tions as the stress effect was significant in the feedback condition
while it diminished without feedback. Mixed gambles might be
more difficult to process as gain and loss amounts and their
respective probabilities have to be integrated. Therefore, feed-
back about previous decision outcomes might be an important
mechanism influencing choice in mixed gambles.
DIFFERENTIAL STRESS EFFECTS ON RISK vs. AMBIGUITY
The present study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study
that investigated stress effects on decision making under ambigu-
ity independent from feedback learning. We did not find evidence
for altered decision making under ambiguity. It is important
to keep in mind that the alternative option in this task was a
risky prospect. Our results therefore indicate that stress does
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not increase the propensity to accept uncertainty beyond that of
specified risks. Once again, learning from feedback might be the
driving mechanism behind the stress effects reported for decision
making under ambiguity in previous studies (i.e., Preston et al.,
2007; Lighthall et al., 2009; van den Bos et al., 2009). Our results
furthermore point to the importance of distinguishing between
decisions from description and decisions from experience when
investigating stress effects on economic decision making.
ROLE OF CORTISOL IN MEDIATING THE STRESS EFFECTS
In the present study, we found no differences in gambling behav-
ior between the stress group as a whole and controls. High
variability in the response to stress regarding physiological stress
markers was noted earlier (e.g., Kudielka et al., 2009), but also
regarding stress effects on decision making (Starcke et al., 2008).
Thus, two reasonable explanations exist why we found stress
effects on decision making only in the subgroup of cortisol
responders. If the cortisol increase is taken as an objective indi-
cator of experienced stressfulness, only those participants that
were reliably affected by our stress induction protocol showed
stress effects on decision making. On the other hand, cortisol
could itself be mechanistically involved in the observed effect.
Previous studies suggest a causal role for cortisol in mediating
stress effects on risk taking (Starcke et al., 2008; van den Bos et al.,
2009; Pabst et al., 2013a), although this might not be the only
mechanism behind stress effects (Lighthall et al., 2012). Indeed,
recent pharmacological studies reported effects of hydrocortisone
administration on risk taking in lotteries (Putman et al., 2010;
Kandasamy et al., 2014).
One possible molecular mechanism could be the interplay of
stress-induced supraoptimal levels of cortisol and dopamine in
the prefrontal cortex (PFC), restraining functioning of this brain
region that is known to exert top-down control over behavior.
Stress leads to a shift from prefrontal to subcortical processing of
information, resulting in loss of top-down control and strength-
ening of stimulus-driven reactions (Piazza and Le Moal, 1997;
Erickson et al., 2003; Arnsten, 2009; Scholz et al., 2009; Schwabe
et al., 2012). Stimuli that are attractive at first glance, like the
possibility to win, could then override cognitive control mecha-
nisms and more directly influence behavior, leading to a higher
probability of choosing risky options (cf. Knoch et al., 2006). A
recent fMRI study indeed pointed to decreased prefrontal activ-
ity during processing of rewards in stressed subjects (Ossewaarde
et al., 2011). Similar mechanisms are also suggested by studies
using stimulation techniques (i.e., repetitive transcranial mag-
netic stimulation and transcranial direct current stimulation)
to directly manipulate PFC functioning during risky decision
making (Knoch et al., 2006; Fecteau et al., 2007a,b).
Additionally, stress could lead to increased dopaminergic sig-
naling in the striatum, thereby increasing reward salience and risk
taking (cf. Mather and Lighthall, 2012; Starcke and Brand, 2012).
Indeed, there is evidence for increased dopaminergic activity in
striatal regions under stress, which might be mediated by gluco-
corticoids (Piazza and LeMoal, 1997; Adler et al., 2000; Pruessner
et al., 2004; Scott et al., 2006). Imaging as well as pharmaco-
logical studies substantiate the involvement of the striatum and
the dopaminergic system in reward anticipation (Knutson et al.,
2005; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Trepel et al., 2005; Rogers,
2011; St. Onge et al., 2011). Furthermore, altered decision mak-
ing is reported for patients with perturbed dopaminergic system
functioning and in relation to several dopaminergic polymor-
phisms (for a recent review, see Rogers, 2011).
LIMITATIONS
It could be seen as a limitation that a between-subjects design
was used in the study. Although this is a common way to inves-
tigate stress effects on cognitive performance, a within-subjects
design would be valuable in order to reduce heterogeneity regard-
ing risk preferences as well as stress responses. To address this
issue, working memory was assessed as covariate in our study,
but only after the stress induction and the decision making task.
Nevertheless, as group means did not differ regarding this mea-
sure, we assume that stress has not influenced it. Furthermore,
stress seems not to affect working memory as assessed with sim-
ple tasks like the digit span forward task that was used in our
study (Schoofs et al., 2009). Another limitation concerns the
presentation format of the risk task. Probabilities were depicted
graphically, so there might have been some vagueness regarding
the actual numerical probabilities. Future studies should provide
the probabilities in a numerical format. It should be mentioned
that the division of the stress group into cortisol responders and
nonresponders, although common in stress research, leads to a
correlational nature of data. It cannot be excluded that a third fac-
tor influences both, risk taking and the cortisol response to stress,
or that those who are risk seeking are those who show a marked
response to acute stress. Yet, in our opinion causal influences of
cortisol on risk taking are the most plausible (see Discussion).
CONCLUSION
Our study shows that stress, as indicated by a reliable cortisol
response, can affect risk taking independent of feedback-based
learning processes. Yet, this effect seems to be highly dependent
on task characteristics. Here, we observed a higher rate of risk
taking in cortisol responders only in the pure gain domain but
not in the pure loss and the mixed domains. Furthermore, acute
stress did not influence gambling under ambiguity. More gener-
ally, our results point to the importance of considering crucial
distinctions made by economic theory when investigating stress
effects on economic decision making.
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